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THE CASE OF FRUSTRATED OR UNSUCCESSFUL
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPING LEGAL CONCEPTS
IN FLORIDA
JoHN E. SCHULMAN, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION

In a small but significant number of instances, the parties to Florida's
new public employee collective bargaining process have failed to ratify labor
contracts. The constitutional, statutory and administrative legal implications of these unsuccessful or frustrated bargaining efforts are the subject
for review in this article. Interest in the law applicable to these matters has
grown dramatically as participation in public employee bargaining has
rapidly increased., Furthermore, public awareness of collective bargaining
problems has been heightened by frustrated or unsuccessful bargaining
attempts which have resulted in either significant community disturbances
or illegal strikes.2
Successful collective organization of public employees and the implied
threat of collective bargaining to the continuity of all public services are
contemporary facts.8 Rational and effective legal concepts, applicable when
bargaining fails, are therefore of the highest social importance. This article
represents a review of the relevant legal concepts as they have developed to
date in Florida. The article includes: a discussion of the historical and
political background of Florida public employee bargaining, an analysis and
survey of the bargaining obligation, impasse procedures and anti-strike pro-B.A. 1973, J.D. 1976, University of Florida; Member, The Texas and Florida Bars.
My particular thanks are due to Professor Dexter Delony, William E. Powers, Esq.,
and LeAnne van Elburg, for their great assistance.
1. The effective date of Florida's current collective bargaining law was January

i1, 1975.

According to statistics compiled by the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission,
as of December 13, 1978, more than 435 employee organizations had been certified representing in excess of 247,500 of theState's approximately 490,000 public employees. As of
the same date, 10 additional elections were scheduled or pending scheduling and numerous
negotiations for consent election agreements were then under way. Interview with Charles
Magalian, Supervisor of Elections of the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission
(Dec. 13, 1978). See also R. Johnson, Recession Stalls Florida Unions, FLORIDA TREND
(November 1976.)
2. The last strikes of which this author has knowledge were the Hollywood security
guards' strike of August 1976 and the. Halifax Hospital Strike of April 1976. But see the
discussion of the expanded definition of a strike in the text accompanying note 97 infra.
3. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE POLICY REGULATIONS FOR
PUBLIC SEcroR LABOR RELATIONS (1975) [hereinafter cited as Summaryl, in which every
state except Mississippi is reported as having developed some legislative or policy guidelines
jor public sector labor relations.
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visions of Florida law, and a discussion of the role of administrative procedure when bargaining fails.
HISTORICAL AND

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING

OF

IN FLORIDA

Presaging much of modern labor theory, American economist, Henry
Carter Adams, in 1896 suggested that collective bargaining, the formal labor
contract, and grievance arbitration were imperative concepts in the continuing
development of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 4 Adams argued that avoidance of industrial strife could be avoided only by recognizing some enforceable interest of the workers. In the system of production Adams, however,
rejected the communist or socialist solution of collective ownership as falling
outside the "regime of contract" which he regarded as "the vital principle of
liberty in the industrial world."
Adams' self-labeled "conservative" solution to the problem of industrial
strife was clearly reflected some forty years later in the Wagner Act, the
original enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6 Authorities explain that the sponsors of the Wagner Act felt and still feel that the
creation of enforceable rights to organize and bargain collectively in the
private sector was the best method of achieving industrial peace while
protecting personal and economic liberty to the maximum extent.7 The
Wagner Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1937 as a valid exercise of
the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.8
A state's authority to provide for public sector collective bargaining is
based upon the state's residual police powers and does not depend upon the
United States Constitution's commerce clause. Furthermore, under the
majority holding of the United States Supreme Court in National League of
Cities v. Usery,9 it now appears that most prospective federal legislation in
the area cannot rest directly upon the commerce dause as a constitutional
foundation.' 0
Public sector collective bargaining laws together with comparable laws
in the private sector share the purpose of protecting the public from disruptions in the flow of important goods and services of which the government
has become a major provider.
In Florida, prior to the adoption of the 1968 constitution, public employees
did not possess an absolute right to bargain collectively with their employers. 1
4. Adams presented these thoughts in the first Presidential Address before the American
Economic Association. H.C. ADAMS, Economics and jurisprudence, in Two ESSAYS BY
HENRY CARTER ADAMS 135-62 (1969).
5. Id. at 153.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§151-168 (1970) (originally enacted as Nat'l Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,
§§151-168, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)).
7. A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 96-97 (1969).
8. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10. ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS 57 (1977). Consider, however, the
familiar "indirect" funding oriented controls which the federal government widely uses.
11. See Craver & LaPeer, The Legal Obligations of Governmental Employers and Labor

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss5/3

2

Schulman: The Case of Frustrated or Unsuccessful Public Employee Collective
1978]

PUBLIC EMPLOYER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

In article I, section 6 of the new constitution, however, a new combination of
three state labor relations principles was ratified as follows:
Right to work - The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and
through a labor organization, to bargain collectively, shall not be
denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.' 2
The next year in Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Ryan,1s the
Florida supreme court interpreted the latter two provisions together to mean
that "with the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the
same rights of collective bargaining as are granted private employees by
Section 6."14

Thus, three constitutional principles are operative with respect to public
employees: the choice as to union membership or non-membership is privileged,' 5 the collective bargaining right is privileged, and the right to strike
is denied.' 6 An inherent tension is apparent among these three principles
which is not present in private sector collective bargaining. The right to
bargain collectively in the private sector is usually accompanied by the
right to engage in an economic strike, as well as the right to contract for
a union shop unless the right to work concept is recognized.17
The Ryan court also pointed to the fact that public employees' bargaining rights were not fully implemented under the existing Florida statutes.
The court urged the legislature to fill the definitional and procedural void.
Three years later, in 1972, the court in Dade County Classroom Teachers
Ass'n v. The Legislature,"" indicated that it would soon be forced to judi-

cially implement public employees' bargaining rights unless the legislature
acted. Comprehensive public employee bargaining was initiated in Florida
Organizations Under the Recognition-CertificationProvisionsof the FloridaPublic Employees
Relations Act, 27 U. FIA. L. REv. 705, 705 n.2 (1975).
12. FrL&. CoNsr. art. I, §6 (1968).
13. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
14. Id. at 905.
15. In Florida Education Association/United, No. 76E-854 (Jan. 14, 1976), the Florida
Public Employees Relations Commission denied a petition for Adoption of Agency Rules
which called for allowance of a "fair share" fee assessment from non-union unit members
for services rendered by an employee organization to all members. The Commission reasoned
that such an assessment would violate the "right to work" doctrine of article I, section 6
of the Florida Constitution. That decision and reasoning were affirmed on appeal. Florida
Educ. Ass'n/United v. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 346 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Ist D.C.A.
1976).
16. It can be argued that a statutorily granted "privilege" to strike under controlled
circumstances would not be unconstitutional. Note, however, that in FLA. STAT. §447201(4)
(1977), the Statement of Policy to the PERA, the legislature refers to a "constitutional prohibition against strikes by public employees .. "
17. The right to work concept is an assurance that a person will not be denied employment because of non-membership in a labor organization. For an example of a right to
work provision, see FLA. CONsT. art. I, §6"(1,968):
18. 269 So. 2d 684 (Fi. .1972). '. ".
.
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in 1975 when the legislature replaced the year-old Fire Fighters Bargaining
Act 19 wth the Florida Public Employees Relations Act (PERA).20
The Act is as broad as article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. It
creates a Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) to administer and
enforce its terms.2 1 The PERA clearly reflects the right to work doctrine,2 2sets forth a sophisticated statutory structure supporting the constitutional
right to bargain collectively,23 and provides severe sanctions for engaging in
a public employee strike.2 - Thus, the inherent tension among the constitutional principles is carried forward into the Act. Nowhere is the tension
more apparent than in the statutory sections which are the particular concern of this article- those provisions dealing directly or indirectly with the
exceptional case of frustrated or unsuccessful bargaining. Such unsuccessful
bargaining accentuates the internal stress resulting from a legal right to
bargain collectively coupled with a prohibited right to strike.
THE ROLE OF STATUTORY
WITH FRUSTRATION

PROVISIONS

DEALING

IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS

The first step in analyzing the function of those statutory provisions in
the PERA concerned with frustration in the bargaining process is the examination of the nature and scope of the statutory bargaining process in general.
Statutes addressing public sector bargaining are frequently divided into two
broad categories: those mandating collective negotiations comparable to the
bargaining obligation imposed in the private sector, and those which impose
upon the public employer only an obligation to meet and confer with
employees before unilaterally making decisions about terms and conditions
of employment. Most state public sector labor statutes do not fit completely
into one category or the other, although the trend appears to be away from
the meet and confer model and toward the stronger obligation imposed in
25
a modified collective negotiations framework.
The Florida PERA contains provisions typical of a collective negotiations
statute. The bargaining obligation is set forth in section 309 of the Act as
follows:
After an employee organization has been certified pursuant to the
provisions of this part, the bargaining agent for the organization and
the chief executive officer of the appropriate public employer or
employers, jointly, shall bargain collectively in the determination of
the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of the public
employees within the bargaining unit. The chief executive officer or
19. FLA.

20.

STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§§447.20-.34 (repealed 1975).
§§447.201-.607 (1977).

21. The statute as amended in 1977 provides for a full time commisison of three
members. FLA. STAT. §447.205 (1977).

22. See
23.
24.
25.
MIcH.

FLA. STAT.

§§447.301', .303 (1977).

See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
See text accompanying notes 94-120 infra.
See generally Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71
L. REv. 885, 895-933 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
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shall
his representative and the bargaining agent or its representative
26
meet at reasonable times and bargain in good faith.
In a 1977 amendment to the Act, the legislature attempted to define "good
faith bargaining," using both positive examples of good faith efforts and
negative examples of conduct indicating bad faith. 7 The amended statutory
language generally reflects established private sector principles and does not
28
appear to conflict with announced decisions under the prior law.
The Act designates "refusal to bargain collectively" or "failing to bargain
collectively in good faith" as forbidden unfair labor practices for either side.29
As a general rule, unfair labor practices are subject to administrative sanctions under the PERA s0 with ultimate enforcement power vested in the
district courts of appeal.s,
While the statutory scheme mandating and enforcing collective negotiations in the PERA draws heavily on similar provisions in private sector
labor law, 2 the analogy is not precise. The modifications from a pure collective negotiations scheme are numerous and fundamental, particularly with
respect to those provisions dealing with frustration in the bargaining process.
26. FLA. STAT. §447.309 (1977).
27. FLA. STAT. §447.203(17) (1977) reads as follows: "'Good faith bargaining' shall
mean, but not be limited to, the willingness of both parties to meet at reasonable times
and places, as mutually agreed upon, in order to discuss issues which are proper subjects
of bargaining, with the intent of reaching a common accord. It shall include an obligation
for both parties to participate actively in the negotiations with an open mind and a
sincere desire, as well as making a sincere effort, to resolve differences and come to an
agreement. In determining whether a party failed to bargain in good faith, the commission
shall consider the total conduct of the parties during negotiations as well as the specific
incidents of alleged bad faith. Incidents indicative of bad faith shall include, but not be
limited to, the following occurrences: (a) Failure to meet at reasonable times and places
with representatives of the other party for the purpose of negotiations. (b) Placing unreasonable restrictions on the other party as a prerequisite to meeting. (c) Failure to discuss
bargainable issues. (d) Refusing, upon reasonable written request, to provide public
information, excluding work products as defined in §.447.605. (e) Refusing to negotiate
because of an unwanted person on the opposing negotiating team. (f) Negotiating directly
with employees rather than with their certified bargaining agent. (g) Refusing to reduce
a total agreement to writing."
28. See, e.g., Duval County School Bd. v. PERC, 353 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978);
School Bd. of Escambia County v. PERC, 350 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977).
29. See FLA. STAT. §447.501<1)(f) (1977) with respect to a public employer and FLA.
STAT. §447.501<2) (c) (1977) with respect to a public employee organization.
30. FaA. STAT. §447.503(4) (a) 1977).

31.

FLA. STAT.

§447.504 (1977).

32. The Second District Court of Appeal has expressly noted that the procedures
incorporated in the PERA were similar to those followed in labor matters at the federal
level. Public Employees Relation Comm'n. v. City of Naples, 327 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1976). Private sector labor precedent is, because of that similarity, widely cited under
the Act. PERC has held that private sector precedent, while not binding, should be given
"great weight." Liuna, Local Union 517, 11 FPER 39 (Oct. 10, 1975). Moreover, the
Florida Supreme Court has held that court decisions under a statute or statutory provisions of another jurisdiction should be accepted in Florida when the legislature in
Florida enacts a substantially similar statute or provision. State v. Aiuppa, 298 So. 2d 391,
394 (Fla. 1974).
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Usually in the private sector, frustration in collective bargaining will ultimately be resolved by a test of the relative economic strength of the parties.
Both the strike and lockout are permissible within the parameters of good
faith bargaining. The general rule in the private sector is that an economic
showdown may be continued indefinitely without interference by law. In
Florida and a majority of other jurisdictions, such economic combat is not
permitted in the context of public employee collective bargaining. Part of
the PERA provisions for frustrated or incomplete bargaining is, therefore,
3
a complex set of anti-strike provisions. 3
In addition, the Act sets forth a series of provisions designed to relieve
the tension arising when bargaining breaks down and the exercise of collective economic power by public employees is foreclosed. The relevant statutory
provisions are designated "impasse procedures." 31 Summarily described,
impasse procedures under the PERA include four major sequential components: (1) permissive mediation, (2) public advisory arbitration, (3) public
hearing, and (4) resolution of remaining issues by legislative hearing of
3 5
the government involved.
A number of arguments have been advanced justifying the proscription
of economic confrontation in public sector labor relations36 Apparently widespread public acceptance of these arguments has shaped the present Florida
law, including the statutory impasse procedures and anti-strike provisions,
as well as the constitutional prohibition of a right to strike for public
employees.
One of the primary and most readily accepted justifications for precluding
direct economic confrontation in the public sector is the danger of harm to
the public health or safety when public services, especially critical public
services, are curtailed or suspended.3 7 Examples of devastating property loss
or death allegedly the result of walkouts or slowdowns in New York, Dayton,
San Francisco, Memphis, and other locations are frequently cited by critics
of public employee unionism.
Advocates of the public employee strike argue, on the other hand, that
few legitimate distinctions can be made between the public and private
sectors in this regard since each sector provides a range of similar or identical
services to the public. They contend that the public can be adequately protected from unacceptable loss in a number of ways: by injunction if legally
justified, 3 by other legal limitation or qualification of the confrontation, 39
33. See text accompanying notes 94-120 infra.
34. See FLA. STAT. §447.409 (1977).
35. For more complete discussion, see text accompanying notes 55-86 infra.
36. See generally A. ABOUD & G. ABOUD, THE RiCHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
1-9 (Key Issues Series No. 15, 1974) [hereinafter cited as THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT].

37. In THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, supra note 36, at 5-6, this issue
is discussed in terms of "essentiality of public services."
38. There is a body of law which recognizes the residual power of the states to enjoin
extreme conduct. For the latest, analysis of this area by the Supreme Court. see Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978).
See also International Union, UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Dade County v.
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by voluntary employee restraint, or by traditional countermeasures used in the
private sector, including replacement of strikers by emergency, temporary or
permanent personnel. 40
Economic confrontation in the public sector is a political matter which
the people of Florida have emphatically and repeatedly disallowed by statute
and constitutional amendment.41 That political judgment undoubtedly reflects
an underlying assumption that a fundamental distinction exists between the
public and private sectors. The validity of the underlying assumption deserves
further discussion.
An elementary principle of public finance is that public institutions
generally provide services which are of extremely high social importance.
In many instances, such services would be prohibitively expensive if offered
by the private sector without public subsidy. In some instances, no profit
margin whatsoever would be available to attract private investment. Arguably,
therefore, restrictions upon economic confrontation in the public sector are
justifiable because their suspension or curtailment would have a disproportionately higher social cost than would abatement of private sector services.
Other commonly accepted justifications for prohibiting economic confrontation in the public sector arise from a perceived need to protect the democratid political process. These arguments in essence are based upon the proposition that the choice as to quantity and quality of public. services is a
political question. 4 2 Therefore, the public employees' use of economic power,
in the form of collective activity such as a strike, will ultimately result in
disproportionately high employee representation in the political decisionmaking process. Ideally, according to this view, the public should decide on
a one-man one-vote basis whether to tax itself in order to increase public
services or to increase public employee compensation. Alternatively, assuming
the choice to be in the hands of an elected representative, that representative's
discretion should be unfettered by the economic, as opposed to the political,
43
power of the public employee group.
A different exposition of the same argument is found in the proposition

that a right to strike for public employees is based upon a false analogy to
the adversary relationship between private equity owners and employees made
necessary by the ultimate issue of division of profits. Critics of the public
Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965).
39. An interesting example is a 1969 Montana nurses act which grants a qualified
right to strike. The strike is prohibited, however, if a simultaneous strike is possible at
health care facilities within 150 miles of each other. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §41-2209 (1977).
40. The legal status of strikers and the terms and conditions of their replacements
have been dealt with, in many cases. See' NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. '375
(1967); NLRPB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 888 U.S. 26 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.R.B.
175 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
41. See notes 92-118 infra and accompanying text.
42. In THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PuBIuc EMPLOYMENT, supra note 36, at 4-5, this argument is described in terms of "the normal American process."
43. See generally R. DOHERTY & W. OB1xa, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BO.ARDS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD, 96-11S (1967).
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employee strike reason that such strikes will damage democratic government
by unjustifiably fostering adversary factions among public servants and within
the general public.
Upon careful analysis, it can be observed that each of the foregoing arguments in favor of prohibiting economic confrontation in the public sector
omits any consideration of the interests of the employee groups involved.
Among employee groups the interests affecting wages, hours, and conditions
of employment are similar whether the employer is a public, a private or an
intermediate entity. Congress may have had this very similarity in mind when
it amended the NLRA in 1974 to bring most private health care institutions
44
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
The most logical and readily acceptable conclusion to any discussion of
economic confrontation in the public sector is that service interruptions should
be avoided, whenever possible, by the use of effective impasse resolution
techniques. An attempt to implement that conclusion is clearly reflected in
5
the PERA's impasse procedures.4
It is apparent that both the statutory impasse and anti-strike provisions
are intended to prevent the curtailment of public services which might occur
if collective negotiations allowed economic confrontation when public
employee bargaining is frustrated or incomplete. In the following sections
of this article, the relevant statutory structure is surveyed and critically
analyzed.
A SURVEY OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

RELATING TO

FRUSTRATION IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS

The increasing scope of public employee bargaining in Florida will cause
correspondingly more professional contact with those provisions of the PERA
concerning frustrated or incomplete bargaining. 46 The need for professional
assistance will also increase because parties who negotiated successfully during
initial contracts may, for a wide variety of reasons, legitimately assert the
statutory privilege not to agree 47 as that relationship continues and circumstances change. This section is intended to briefly survey a number of relevant
statutory provisions.
The Nature and Statutory Definition of an
Impasse
Impasse, as a legal term, arises in the collective bargaining context. In the
private sector, an impasse occurs when parties are deadlocked in negotiations
directed toward an agreement. The parties are only in agreement that each
is unyielding in its position and that no further progress can be made in
negotiating any mandatory bargaining subject."s It is important to note that
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See 29 U.S.C.A. §§152, 158, 169, 183 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 55-80 infra.
See note I supra.
FLA. STAT. §447.203(14) (1977).
See generally NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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most negotiations never reach a true impasse, although firm positions may be
taken before an agreement is finally reached. The National Labor Relations
Act does not define the term "impasse," and the presence or absence of an
impasse under federal law is usually determined on a case-by-case basis. 49
In contrast, the term "impasse" is defined in the PERA. Until the 1977
legislative session, section 447.403 (1) of the Florida Statutes (1975) set forth
three circumstances under which an impasse was deemed to exist. Two were
deleted in that session. The definition presently retained in the statute
provides that an impasse is a dispute which continues after a reasonable
period of negotiations, concerning the terms and conditions of employment
to be incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement.50 The revised
statute provides that in this situation an impasse may be declared in writing
by either party to both the other party and to the commission. 51 It is significant that the term impasse as thus defined by statute is fundamentally
dissimilar to the private sector concept because a statutory impasse occurs
before the end of the parties' obligations to participate in good faith
52
bargaining.
The two additional circumstances originally set forth in the statute created
automatic impasse conditions. An impasse was deemed to exist if no agreement was reached within sixty days after the commencement of collective
bargaining, or if no agreement was reached seventy days prior to the budget
submission date of the public employer. The legislature, however, has repealed
these provisions53 as well as a broad, somewhat confusing definition of "budget
submission date." 54 In so doing, the legislature removed arbitrary time
restraints upon the bargaining parties. In this respect, Florida statutory law
now more closely parallels the general principles of private sector case law.
Impasse Resolution Procedures Under the PERA
As presently written, the PERA contemplates the use of three distinct
impasse resolution techniques. Mediation is optional and confidential. Special
master's proceedings are public and, under the 1977 amendment to the Act,
mandatory only in the absence of mediation or at the request of either party. 55
The legislative hearing is public and mandatory if the dispute between the
57
parties continues. 56 A brief discussion of these three techniques follows.
49. The presence or absence of an impasse has been held relevant to such issues as: (1)
the legality of a lockout, see Evening News Ass'n, 166 N.L. .B. 219 (1967); and (2) the
scope of the duty to bargain in good faith, especially as related to unilateral changes in
working conditions by the employer, see generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
50. FLA. STAT. §447.403(1) (1977).
51. FA. STAT. §447.403(2) (1977).
52. See text accompanying note 32 .supra.
53. FLA. STAT. §447.403(1) (a975) as amended by Laws 1977, c. 77-343, §15.
54. FLA. STAT. §447.403(2) (1975) as amended by Laws 1977, c. 77-343, §15.
55. FiA. STAT. §447.403(2) (1977).
56. FLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (1977).
57. Research for this subsection, was greatly facilitated by examination of. an unpublished booklet, Use and Abuse of Impasse Procedures, furnished by the Alachua County'
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Mediation
The Act provides that when an impasse occurs, the public employer, the
public employee bargaining agent, or both parties acting jointly may appoint
or secure the appointment of a mediator to assist in the resolution of the
impasse. 58 The Florida Public Employees Relations Commission maintains
a list of qualified mediators.59 The statute does not, however, prevent the
parties from selecting a mediator of their own or from declining mediation
altogether.
As a result of the 1977 amendments, the costs of mediation are borne
equally by the parties. 60 The amended statute supercedes a PERC regulation
which placed the financial burden upon the party or parties requesting the
mediation., 1
Although mediation has a long history in labor relations, 62 the mediator's
role is frequently misunderstood. Mediators have no ultimate power or authority and neither negotiate for the parties nor impose settlements. The mediator
is only incidentally concerned with the merits of either side's position in a
dispute. Traditionally, the mediator's proper concern is with a settlement
acceptable to the parties, not with a right settlement, a wrong settlement,
or the best settlement.
Successful mediators use a number of systematic techniques or devices
in the settlement of disputes. One very important technique is the identification of semantic misunderstandings. Disagreements may turn upon a
given word or phrase rather than the merits of either side's position. For
example, a party may be able to accept a "proposal" which is remarkably
similar to a previously rejected "demand." The mediator may find that in
the heat of collective bargaining the parties have neglected to fully discuss
the substance of their disagreements and have, instead, focused on emotional
conflicts and matters of form.
A second mediation technique frequently used and especially important
to public employee impasse resolution in Florida involves functioning as an
intermediary between physically separated negotiating teams. Parties may
be willing to consider concessions in private discussion with the mediator
which they would never publicly put "on the table" without a tentative
prior discussion. Furthermore, learning the relative importance of the various
bargaining postures, the mediator may be able to suggest a compromise which
ultimately leads to settlement. The intermediary technique is especially
helpful when one party wishes to present or question a single element or subsection of a complex proposal.

Local of FEA/United and by discussions with officers and members of that Local. Acknowledgment and thanks are due.
58. FLA. STAT. §447.403(1) (1977).
59. FLA. STAT. §447.207(5) (1977); 4 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 8H-5.05 (1974).
60. FLA. STAT. §447.407 (1977).
61. 4 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 8H-5.07 (1974).
62. See generally W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECrIVE BARGAINING
(1971).
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Perhaps the least understood mediation technique is simply the application of personal pressure. A mediator using this technique will typically
pressure both sides to settle. He or she will typically present all of the
arguments from both sides while criticizing and calling for reexamination of
position. Frequently the mediator will apply the most pressure to the weakest
side, perhaps by encodraging one member of a bargaining team to break from
the cohesive stance and to consider or state the position of the other side.
A mediator applying the pressure technique may also attempt to "ride
the impasse out" simply by wearing down the resistance to settlement. Mediators may thus call for extremely lengthy bargaining sessions which continue
day after day. Overall, mediation is probably the most effective of the
various available techniques,63 but one that is time consuming, costly, and
not guaranteed.
Despite these limitations, provisions for mandatory mediation would
constitute one of the most helpful changes possible in Florida's public
employee collective bargaining law. Professional mediation from the moment
of impasse, as defined by statute, until the termination of the obligation to
bargain would undoubtedly help to avoid or minimize many of the problems
discussed in following sections of this article.
The Special Master's Hearing and Recommended Decision
The PERA, as recently amended, provides that if a mediator is not
appointed or if requested by either party, the commission shall appoint and
submit all unresolved issues to a special master. 6" The parties may, however, continue to use mediation at any time during collective bargaining.65
The special master is charged with holding public hearings to define
the disputed areas, determine the related facts, and decide all unresolved
contract issues."6 At the hearing, each side may present evidence and argument supporting its position and rebut opposing submissions. -The master is
empowered to administer oaths at the hearing and to issue subpoenas requested
by the parties or sua sponte. The Act sets forth the factors to be considered
by the master in reaching his decision. These factors include comparison of
annual income of other similarly employed persons in the local area, comparison of annual income of public employees employed in governmental
bodies of similar size, the welfare of the public, comparison of the peculiarities
of the employment involved including qualifications or hazards, and availability of public funds.67
Within fifteen calendar days of the close of final hearing, the master
must transmit his or her decision to the commission. Within five additional
63. Research indicates that mediation may be the most frequently used and most
effective impasse resolution technique. See R. JoNEs, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS: AN
EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED REsEARcH. FINAL REPORT, 161-62 (.1975) [hereinafter cited
as JoNEs].
64. FLA. STAT. §447.40(2) (1-977).
65.

Id.

66. FLA.
67. FLA.

STAT. §447.403(3) (1977).
SrAT. §447.405 (1977).
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working days after receipt, the commission must transmit the decision to the
parties.6 The report is discussed in further negotiations and is deemed
approved by both parties unless rejected by written notice filed with the
commission within twenty calendar days after the mailing of the special
master's decision to the parties. 69 The 1977 amendments to the PERA require
that the written notice of rejection include a statement of the cause of
70
rejection and be served upon the other party.
The use of the special master as an impasse resolution technique is largely
unique to public sector collective bargaining.7 It is intended to invite public
attention to the facts of the dispute. For this reason, the device is termed "fact
finding" in other jurisdictions with similar laws.7 2 The underlying theory is
that, given sufficient public attention to the dispute, no party will sustain an
unreasonable position. Public pressure, however, is thought to have a negligible
effect.7
Like mediation, this device demands that disputing parties reassess their
position. Unlike mediation, the master's report can furnish a means of political
face saving for one side or the other. Internal or external politics may require
the public employer or the employee representative to take a position through
impasse which the negotiator for that party realistically knows is not presently
obtainable. In such a case, complying with the master's report may be feasible
while relenting in negotiations would not be acceptable.
The special master's report or fact-finding technique has been moderately
successful as an impasse resolution device in other jurisdictions.7 4 It has,
however, been subject to abuse. The parties may, for example, present the
special master with a long list of unresolved salient issues. Faced with a
"grocery list" of issues, the master may himself begin mediation or otherwise
insist upon further negotiations to clarify or limit the scope of the hearings
and report. Such situations would typically indicate lack of in-depth discussion
before the master became involved.
In some situations, the lack of meaningful discussion when first negotiating
may result from unwitting failure to consider the special master as an integral
part of the collective bargaining process. Since the public hearing and report
were previously mandatory and are now obtainable at the request of either
party, this procedure may become an end in itself. One or both parties may
treat the original negotiations merely as a forum for building a record for the
master rather than reaching an agreement. In this situation, the politics of
public employee labor relations will overshadow the collective bargaining
system.
68. FLA. STAT. §447.403(3) (1977).
69. id.
70. Id.
71. The device is used regularly in the quasi-public railroad and related industries
but seldom in the purely private sector.
72. The term "fact finding board" is used in §209(3)(b) of New York's Taylor Act.
N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw §209(3) (b) (McKinney 1973).
73. See JONES, supra note 63, at 164.
74. Id. at 162.
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Failure to negotiate in good faith in the opening sessions may be deliberate.
If one of the parties wishes to avoid bargaining, it may ignore the original
negotiations or drag out the proceedings before the special master. Public
apathy encourages such behavior. Like mediation, the master's proceedings
are initiated upon request, are not binding, and are automatically followed
by another procedure. In theory, this device stands for public participation
and thoughtful advisory arbitration by a neutral third party. In practice, the
relationship of this device to the overall statutory structure may, on occasion,
avoid both.
The Legislative Hearing
The PERA provides a two step procedure in the event that any part
of the special master's report is rejected by either party.75
Initially, the chief executive officer of the government involved has the
responsibility of reporting the master's decision to that government's legislative body within ten days after the recommended decision is rejected,
together with the officer's recommendations for settling the dispute.7 6 At
the same time, the offiicer must submit his recommendations to the employee
organization, and the employee organization must submit its recommendations
for settlement to the chief executive officer and to the legislative body
7
involved. 7
The legislative body, or an authorized committee thereof, conducts a
public hearing at which the parties are required to explain their position
with respect to the master's report.78 Then, the legislative body takes "such
action as it deems to be in the public interest, including the interest of the
public employees involved." 79
The legislative hearing provisions of the statutory impasse procedure
suggest that three distinct non-legislative entities may attend the hearing:
the employee representative, the public employer and the general public.
The PERA then requires the legislative body to act as a neutral decisionmaker, determining the overall best interest of the public, specifically including
the employees.
It requires only minimal understanding of political' reality and human
nature to perceive how unlikely it is that the legislative body will function
with the dispassionate detachment contemplated by the statutory scheme.
Consider, for example, a dispute involving an organization of public school
teachers and a county school board. Under the PERA definitions the county
school board is both the public employer and the legislative body.8 0 Logic
75.

FLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (1977).
76. FLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (a) (1977). If the public employer is the Board of Regents,
the Governor may also submit his recommendations. Id.
77. FxLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (a)- (b) (1977).
78. FLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (c) (1977).
79. FLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (d) (1977).
80. The exact identity of the "public employer" with the "legislative body" is not
an infrequent occurence under present interpretations of the PERA. The terms are respectively defined in FLA. STAT. §447.203(2), (10) (1977).
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and common sense dictate that, in most instances, the board will have the
same conception of the public's best interests at the legislative hearing, a conception which its agent, the superintendent/chief executive officer, has propounded throughout the bargaining and impasse procedures.
In a recent decision, 8s the commission considered the impasse duty of a
legislative body having legal identity with the public employer and announced
that the duty includes the "strictest observance of the principles of fairness,
and impartiality. ' '8 2 Although the possibility of commission review thus provides some hope of relief for an employee organization aggrieved by action
of a biased legislative body, the general deficiency of the statutory scheme
remains apparent. The bias problem would hold constant, to a greater or
lesser extent, as to any public employer and legislative body in Florida government, although in all instances the two would not be identical.83 In all
cases, the negotiating representative of the public employer is required by
the Act to "consult with, and attempt to represent the views of, the legislative
body of the public employer," 8' throughout the bargaining process.
Aside from considerations of possible prejudice on the part of the legislative body, the legislative hearing provisions of the Act are in need of
amendment because of probable constitutional deficiency. The 1977 negotiations between the Florida Board of Regents and the United Faculty of
Florida aptly illustrate the problem. During part of the negotiations and
all of the impasse, the legislature was not in session within the meaning
of the Florida Constitution. 5 Thus, the statute required the board to consult
with a legally nonexistent legislative entity. Impasse resolution by any committee of an inactive legislature would also have had doubtful validity.
In other jurisdictions, legislative bodies have chosen to return one or
more issues to the parties for further negotiations. In essence, however, the
legislative hearing represents the last legal step in the public sector dispute
settlement procedure. Occasionally in Florida and in other states, this hearing
has been treated more as a political or even theatrical event than as a recognizable component of a collective bargaining system. However, this phenomenon may be justifiable and, in fact, inevitable because public employee
8
bargaining ultimately raises political issues. 6

Procedural and Substantive Issues Arising After
the Termination of Formal Impasse Procedures
The legislative hearing represents the termination of formally designated
81. City of Boca Raton, 4 FPER 4040 (Jan. 12, 1978).
82. Id. at 88.
83. For example, the Act designates the Board of Regents as the public employer
for the State University System. FLA. STAT. §447.203(2) (1977). The appropriate legislative
body would appear to be the Florida Legislature. See FA. STAT. §447.203(10) (1977). An
"authorized committee" would probably be appointed for purposes of a legislative hearing.
See FLA. STAT. §447.403(4) (c) (1977).
84. FLA. STAT. §447.309(1) (1977).
85.

FLA. CONsT. art III, §3.

86. See text accompanying notes 35-43 supra.
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impasse procedures. In actual practice, however, a number of complex procedural and substantive issues arise after the legislative body of the government involved has finished its deliberations.
The Act does not specify the proper procedure to be followed by the
parties after the legislative hearing. In practice, questions associated with
contract ratification by vote of the employee organization membership and
legislative action of the government involved, frequently arise soon after the
legislative hearing or at the hearing itself.
The structure of the PERA is very awkward at this juncture. The ratification provisions87 precede the impasse procedures88 in the Act and do not
explicitly contemplate previously disputed items or items which have been
resolved in a legislative hearing. If an agreement is not ratified by the public
employer or approved by majority vote of employees voting in the unit, it
is returned to the parties for further negotiation. 9
Thus, a number of questions arise: May the public employer ratify the
entire contract at the legislative hearing if the public employer and the
legislative body of the government involved are identical? Does resolution
of the disputed items also constitute ratification of those items? If a later
hearing is required for ratification purposes (and this appears to be' the
majority position in practice), may- the public employer refuse to ratify the
contract based upon the contents of previously signed or non-impasse items
without sending all items, including impasse items, back to the table? At the
ratification hearing, may the public employer refuse to ratify items resolved
at the legislative hearing? If the employee organization refuses to ratify the
contract, are the terms of the legislative resolution nevertheless legally enforceable? Does an enforceable contract exist with respect to previously signed or
non-impasse items if the entire contract is ratified by the public employer
but only non-impasse items are ratified by the employee organization?
Recent decisions of the commission have touched upon some of these
issues.99 A comprehensive set of answers should be provided, however, by
87. FLA. STAT. §447.309(1), (4) (1977). Subsection 1 provides in part, "Any agreement
signed by the chief executive officer and the bargaining agent shall not be binding on
the public employer until such agreement has been ratified by the public employer and
by public employees who are members of the bargaining unit, subject to the provisions of
subsections (2) and (3). However, with respect to statewide bargaining units, any agreement signed by the Governor and the bargaining agent for such a unit shall not be
binding until approved by the public employees who are members of the bargaining
unit, subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3)." Subsection 4 provides, "If the
agreement is not ratified by the public employer or is not approved by a majority vote of
employees voting in the unit, in accordance with procedures adopted by the commisison,
the agreement shall be returned to the chief executive officer and the employee organiiation for further negotiations."
88. FLA. STAT. §§447.403-.409 (1977).
89. F A. STAT..§447.309(4) (1977).
90. In City of South Miami, 4 FPER 4065 (Feb. 2, 1978), the Commisison determined
that a public employer, by disapproving a contract because of dissatisfaction with its
own prior resolution of impasse items, committed an unfair labor practice. The most
comprehensive recent discussion of the Commission's view of the legislative hearing and
ratification procedures is found in City of Winter Park, :4 FPER f 4278 (Aug. 9, 1978),
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PERC exercising its express rulemaking authority with respect to ratification
procedures 9i or by amendment to the Act. An appropriate rule or statutory
amendment with respect to these issues would embody the following general
propositions intended to harmonize the impasse and ratification procedures:
1. At the legislative hearing, all impasse items and the "signed off"
negotiated items should be adopted by the legislative body.
2. The package adopted by the legislative body should be offered as
a whole contract to the employee organization for rejection or
acceptance.
3. If no contract is reached, past practice, along with resolved impasse
items, should continue in effect 92 until new negotiations result in a
contract or another impasse to be resolved by further action of the
legislative body.
The statutory provision dealing with legislative appropriations is also a
notable matter of concern. Section 309 (2) of the Act provides as follows:
Upon execution of the collective bargaining agreement, the chief
executive shall, in his annual budget request or by other appropriate
means, request the legislative body to appropriate such amounts as
shall be sufficient to fund the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. If less than the requested amount is appropriated, the collective bargaining agreement shall be administered by the chief executive officer on the basis of the amounts appropriated by the legislative
body. The failure of the legislative body to appropriate funds sufficient
to fund the collective bargaining agreement shall not constitute, nor
be evidence of, any unfair labor practice. 93
Clearly, this provision represents a major retention of political veto power
over the bargaining process when negotiations are successful. An important
question is whether the PERA requires a similar result when issues arising
from unsuccessful negotiations are resolved by legislative hearing and later
accepted by the employee organization as part of a ratified contract. Like the
ratification provisions, this subsection precedes the formal impasse procedures
and does not explicitly contemplate their operation. The broad exculpatory
which held inter alia, that the legislative resolution of impasse items was "effective" from
the date it was passed, despite refusal of the employee organization to ratify the proposed
overall agreement.
91. The commission has broad rule making authority subject to the right of the
legislature to amend or rescind such rules. FLA. STAT. §447.607 (1977). Various specific
sections of the Act also refer to the promulgation or adoption of rules or procedures,
including FLA. STAT. §447.309(4) (1977), which deals with ratification. It is not entirely
clear how wide the mandate of subsection (4) is intended to be.
92. An exception to this proposition would probably be appropriate where the legislative body has been guilty of refusal to bargain or failure to bargain in good faith with
respect to impasse items. See text accompanying notes 145-147 infra. See also Geiger v.
Duval County School Bd., 857 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978), in which the First District
Court of Appeal affirmed a circuit court order which ordered a public employer and
employee organization to continue under most of the terms of an expired agreement as
part of an order enjoining a "threatened" strike.
93. FLA. STAT. §447.309(2) (1977).
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language dealing with unfair labor practices arising from appropriations may,
therefore, not apply to impasse items which become part of a contract. If the
legislature did intend the exculpatory language to apply under such circumstances, the meaningfulness of the legislative hearing would frequently be
minimal. The form of disputed items would be resolved at the legislative
hearing but not their substance in the sense of fiscal implications. This subsection should be repealed or at least amended to clarify and limit the scope
of its applicability.
The Anti-Strike Provisions
In the statement of policy to the PERA, the Florida legislature has
declared that it is the public policy of the state "to protect the public by
assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions
of government." 94 Further, that policy is, in part, best effectuated by
"[r]ecognizing the constitutional prohibition against strikes by public
employees and providing remedies for violations of such prohibition." 95
The PERA implements the constitutional prohibition against public
employee strikes in a series of complex and interrelated anti-strike provisions.
The term "strike" is defined very broadly in the Act as follows:
"Strike" means the concerted failure of employees to report for duty;
the concerted absence of employees from their positions; the concerted
stoppage of work by employees; the concerted submission of resignations by employees; the concerted abstinence in whole or in part by
any group of employees from the full and faithful performance of the
duties of employment with a public employer for the purpose of
inducing, influencing, condoning, or coercing a change in the terms
and conditions of employment or the rights, privileges, or obligations
of public employment, or participating in a deliberate and concerted
course of conduct which adversely affects the services of the public
employer; the concerted failure of employees to report for work after
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement; and picketing in
furtherance of a work stoppage. The term "strike" shall also mean any
overt preparation, including but not limited to, the establishment of
strike funds with regard to the above-listed activities.1
The strike is prohibited twice in the PERA. Instigating or supporting a
strike in any positive manner is designated as, unfair labor practice for an
employee organization. 7 After charge, investigation and hearing, a strike
is subject to the broad remedial powers of the PERC set forth in the operative
provision of the Act dealing with unfair labor practice procedures. 08 The
Act also makes clear 99 that a strike brought to the attention of the commission
94. FLA. STAT. §447.201 (1977).
95. FILA. STAT. §447.201(4) (.1977).
96. FLA. STAT. §447.203(6) (1977). The final sentence of this definition was added
during the 1977 legislative session along with a definition of "strike funds." FLA. STAT.
§447.203(7) (1977). The constitutionality of the amendments is questionable.
97. FLA. STAT. §447.501(2)(e) (1977).
98. FLA. STAT. §447.503 (1977).
99. See FLA. STAT. §447.501(2) (e) (1977).
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as an unfair labor practice is subject to the independent strike penalties provision located in the separate section.100
Participating in a strike by instigating or supporting a strike in any
positive manner is also generally prohibited for an employee organization
or an employee by section 505 of the Act.' 01 Violations of section 505 are
penalized under section 507 provisions' 02 which prescribe both judicial and
administrative sanctions.
As of this writing, only one subsection of the penalties provision has
consistently been given effect-that subsection allowing the commission or
any involved or affected public employer to seek a temporary and permanent
injunction against a public employee strike. 1 3 The First District Court of
Appeal has rejected the contention that the commission cannot exercise its
standing under this subsection unless an unfair labor practice charge has
been filed. 0 4
Suits to enjoin public employee strikes may be brought in the circuit
court having proper jurisdiction and venue under the statutes and rules of
civil procedure.' 05 Such suits are granted "priority over all matters on the
court's docket except other emergency matters."'1 6 If an injunction issued
pursuant to the penalties provision is not promptly complied with, the
circuit court is directed by statute, upon application of the plaintiff, to
initiate contempt proceedings against those who appear to be in violation.107
Fines are authorized within statutory limitations against the responsible
employee organizations and responsible officers, agents or representatives.' x0
The Act also states that an employee organization is liable for damages
sustained by the public employer as a result of a section 505 violation.109
In such cases, the circuit court is empowered to enforce judgments by attachment or garnishment of union initiation fees or dues ordinarily deducted by
public employers."- However, the civil action for damages may not be
maintained until matters pending before the commission at the time of the
strike or initiated within thirty days after the strike's inception have been
finally adjudicated."' Also, the circuit court's computation of damages must
take into consideration administrative assessments already recovered by the
2
public employer.
100. FLA. STAT. §447.507 (1977).
101. FLA. STAT. §447.505 (1977).
102. FLA. STAT. §447.507 (1977).
103. FLA. STAT. §447.507(2) (1977).
104. Broward County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. PERC, 331 So. 2d 342 (1st D.C.A.),
cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1976).
105. F A. STAT. §447.507(2) (1977).
106. FLA. STAT. §447.507(1) (1977).
107. FLA. STAT. §447.507(3) (1977). There is some question as to whether criminal or

civil contempt proceedings are intended by this subsection. A statutory amendment would
be helpful.
108. FLA. STAT. §447.507(3) (1977).
109.

FLA. STAT. §447.507(4) (1977).

110. id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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The Act grants the commission a range of sanctions to be imposed as a
result of violation of section 505.113 This includes an assessment of penalties
against both employees and employee organizations. When action against an
employee is involved, the Act calls for a hearing on notice conducted according to rules to be promulgated by the commission to determine if an employee
has violated section 505.114 If the commission determines that a violation

has taken place, it may order termination of employment or set a probationary employment period with certain other associated penalties.115
If the commission determines that an employee organization has violated
section 505, available remedial actions are numerous. Summarily described,
they include: (1) the issuance of cease and desist orders; (2) the suspension
or revocation of the employee organization's certification; (3) the revocation
of the privilege of check off; and (4) the assessment of a fine up to $20,000.00
per day or the damage to the public employer, whichever is higher.t 1 6
Further, no employee organization may be certified until one year after
final payment of any fine assessed.117
It is apparent upon review of the statutory structure that the legislature
has considered very seriously its announced intention to recognize the constitutional prohibition of a public employee right to strike. However, the
internal tension among the provisions of article I, section 6, of the Florida
Constitution prevails even in these statutory anti-strike provisions. An attempt
to balance the constitutional right to bargain collectively with the constitutional strike prohibtion is apparent in the legislative determination that
"any action or inaction by the public employer or its agents that provoked
or tended to provoke the strike by the public employees"11 s should be taken
into account when assessing monetary damages. Both the circuit court in a

civil action"" and the commission-

0

are explicitly required to consider this

factor.
CRITICISMS OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

TO FRUSTRAToN IN

THE

RELATING

BARGAINING PROCESS

The following section contains a critical analysis of the overall approach
taken in the PERA to frustrated bargaining. There is, however, a basic and
underlying question which should be considered first: Does effective collective
FrA. STAT. §447.507(5), (6) (1977).
1,14. FLA. STAT. §447.507(5) (1977). The Commission has not yet promulgated rules
113.

dealing with any of the anti-strike provisions. In Broward County Classroom Teachers
Ass'n, the First District Court of Appeal rejected appellants' contention that the PERC
did not have standing to seek an injunction until such regulations were promulgated.
Appellants' case would probably have been stronger if the particular facts contemplated
by this subsection had been involved (ie., administrative action against an individual
employee). 331 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Ist D.C.A.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1976).
115. FLA. STAT. §447.507(5) (1977).
,I.6. FMA. STAT. §447.597(6) (a) (1977).
117. FL&. STAT. §447.507(6) (b) (1977).
118. FA. STAT. §447.507<6) (a) (4) (1977).
119. FLA. STAT. §447.507(4) (1977).
.120. FLA. STAT. §447.507(6) (a) (4) (1977).,
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bargaining require a credible strike threat, or at least some significant concession of bargaining power to the public employee organization in exchange
for waiver of the strike?
This issue, in essence, concerns the relative economic and political power of
the parties. Public employee organizations are growing in strength. Common
sense dictates that once these organizations become strong, they will not
accept a legal structure which legitimizes the form but not the substance of
collective bargaining. The substance of bargaining for an employee organization, includes the consistent ability to influence decisions concerning wages,
hours and working conditions of members by any morally acceptable means.
Restated at a broader conceptual level, the issue concerns the fundamental
nature of an effective collective bargaining system. Given that the public
desires its employees to bargain collectively, it follows that the laws implementing that system should affirm the right of the employees to assert all of
their bargaining power; otherwise, the bargaining is a sham. The Supreme
Court of the United States has on several occasions implicitly recognized this
argument as it applies to the private sector.121 The right to strike is specifically protected under the National Labor Relations Act

22

although it is not

13

a fundamental right " or an implied constitutional right.'2
At the policy level, the issue involved is the respect for law. Since both
experience and theory indicate that collective bargaining implies collective
exercise of employee strength, why pass a law which is bound to be broken?
The rest of this analysis is familiar political science and common sense.
Unenforceable laws engender disrespect for government in general and the
legal system in particular, because such laws eventually result in mass civil
disobedience or criminality. Attempts to enforce such laws on a mass basis
place unnatural stress on the legal system, and successful enforcement on an
individual selective basis12 5 risks violation of equal protection rights.
If effective and successful bargaining requires a credible strike threat or a
meaningful concession in return for waiver of the strike, then the question is:
Does the present Florida law provide for either one? Arguably, the threat of
an unconstitutional and statutorily prohibited strike is sufficiently credible to
support a collective bargaining system for public employees. A de facto
recognition of public employee economic power may be all that is needed.
However, considerations of respect for law make that approach unacceptable.
In considering whether the present statutory structure provides a meaningful concession in exchange for waiver of the strike, one should recall the
foregoing survey of pertinent statutory provisions. Recall that the formal
impasse procedures terminate with a political decision-making device rather
121. Consider the reasoning of the Court in NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361
U.S. 477 (1960). In that case, the Court held, in essence, that the use of unprivileged
economic power as harassment was not inconsistent with the duty to bargain in good faith.
122. The right to strike is privileged under the NLRA except as specifically disallowed.
29 U.S.C. §§157-158 (1970).
123. UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
124. United Federaton of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), afl'd mem.,
404 U.S. 802 (1971).
125. See notes 114-115 supra and accompanying text.
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than a traditional bargaining device 1 26 and that the political decision is
not made by a neutral third party but by the legislative body of the public
employer, an entity frequently identical to the public employer or whose
policies are reflected in the employer's bargaining position by law.127 Also
recall that the PERA vests in the same legislative body control of appropriations to meet negotiated obligations and arguably that same control with
respect to impasse items later ratified by both parties.ls
A careful reading of the Act will not support the conclusion that any
meaningful concession in exchange for the strike threat has been granted.
A public employer indisposed to reach an agreement and willing to approach
negotiations in bad faith is almost invited to ignore the Act's general collective negotiations framework. The employer may view its bargaining obligation
in light of the impasse procedures merely as a requirement to meet and confer
before unilaterally adopting the policies of the appropriate legislative body.
It seems indisputable that the statutory structure provides a public employer
in Florida less motivation to bargain fully, fairly and in good faith than a
private sector employer subject to legal economic confrontation by a union.
A related criticism of the Act can be raised with respect to employee
organizations. Because impasse procediires are slow, costly, and weighted
in favor of the public\employer, an employee organization may be motivated
to initiate a work stoppage in order to hasten the intervention of a third
party12 9 or, at least, to attract public attention to the one-sided political

dispute. Faced with an intolerable bargaining position by a public employer
or with bad faith bargaining, a public employee organization may, as an
indirect result of the statutory structure, have less motivation to refrain from
a work stoppage than a private sector union.
There are other matters to consider when evaluating those provisions in
the PERA which relate to frustrated bargaining. The first is that the constitutional right to bargain collectively has been successfully exercised pursuant to the present statutory scheme in at least a substantial majority of
cases. Impasse is the exception, not the rule.130 In most cases the Act is
working despite its underlying tensions.
Also, political decision-making in the face of unsuccessful negotiations
represents a logical and democratic means of effectuating the constitutional
126. See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra.
127. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
128. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
129. See note 139 infra and accompanying text discussing a strike situation in which
the PERC sought an emergency injunction against both parties after which bargaining
was expeditiously restored.
130. This observation is substantiated by the partial statistics available from the
Public Employees Relations Commission. The Commission statistics indicate that approximately 100 special masters were assigned in 1976 and 1977 and 96 through December 13,
1978. To approximate the "impasse rate" very roughly, these figures may be compared
with an increasing number of certified units totaling 435 on December 13, 1978. Interview
with Charles Magalian, Supervisor of Elections of the Florida PERG (Dec. 13, 1978). A
direct comparison would be somewhat misleading, however, for a number of reasons,
including multiple special master assignments and multiple year contracts not yet due
for renegotiation.
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prohibition of the right to strike. Any mechanism for resolving public sector
labor disputes in Florida is bound to reflect the incessant tension between the
constitutional right to bargain collectively and the proscription of services.
Of course, the present. statutory scheme does not represent the only
means of avoiding unlimited economic confrontation between Florida's public
employers and employee organizations. Binding arbitration has been adopted
in a number of jurisdictions, especially with respect to critical services.1a1
A number of jurisdictions allow designated employee groups to strike under
controlled circumstances.132 Non-stoppage or graduated strikes have also
133
been proposed.
Finally, present criticisms of the Act should be qualified and cautious.
Because the PERA is so recent an addition to the Florida law, there is an
absence of well-established judicial or administrative interpretation. Judicial
clarification as well as the pattern and practice of continued administration
may have highly significant. effects.
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
COMMISSION WHEN

RELATIONS

FRUSTRATION IN

BARGAINING OCCURS

The statement of policy in the PERA states that the PERC was created
"to assist in resolving disputes between public employees and public
employers."'' 4 It might then be expected that the commission's policies and
procedures would have salutary effect when frustration occurs in the bargaining process. Ideally, thoughtful administration of the Act should help lessen
the inherent tension present in both the constitution and statutes. Current
indications are that the commission is conscientiously striving to achieve
that goal.
The commission has a formal and an informal mediation function. Informally, the commission staff is available to assist bargaining parties by helping
them understand the Act and its requirements. Formally, the commission acts
in a supervisory capacity with respect to mediation and post-mediation impasse
35
procedures.1
As noted above, the commission also plays an extensive statutory role if
131. Binding arbitration is permissible or mandatory in the District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii. Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See note 133 infra.
1,32. Controlled strikes are permitted in Alaska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.

See note 133 infra.
133. A detailed discussion of such alternatives is beyond the scope of this article.
Interested readers are referred to a thorough summary of enacted statutory provisions

published by the United States Department of Labor, U.S.
STATE POLICY

REGULATIONS

FOR

PUBLIC

SECTOR

DEP'TI OF LABOR, SUMIARY OF

LABOR RELATIONS

outstanding discussion of alternatives for policy matters, R. JONES,

(1975),

as well as an

PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR

RELATIONS:

AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH, FINAL REPORT (1975).
134. FLA. STAT. §447.201(3) (1977).
1,35.FLA. STAT. §447.207(5) (1977). Although the statute contemplates mediators employed
by PERC, none have been employed to date.
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bargaining frustration reaches the ultimate extreme of an illegal work stoppage.138 As of this writing, the commission has moved expeditiously to enjoin
the relatively few public employee strikes which have occurred in Florida.
In at least two instances, however, the commission also successfully sought
injunction of the public employers' activities which allegedly had provoked
the. strike2 37
In addition, the commission has substantial powers to prevent and pro-

hibit unfair labor practices. Frustration in the bargaining process cannot
adequately be discussed without at least a peripheral consideration of the
scope of the duty to bargain. This issue arises most frequently in the context

a
of a refusal to bargain allegation or a charge of bargaining in bad faith.Commission procedures upon the filing of such a charge have in some
instances had a salutary effect upon frustrated bargaining. These procedures
are based on the general statutory provision for the processing of an unfair
labor practice charge.'39
When the commission receives a charge of unfair labor practice, the
charge and supporting materials are analyzed to determine if there is subo
stantial evidence indicating a prima fade violation of the Act. 4 The commission has largely discontinued its previous practice of extensive field investigation. Faced with a formal charge to spur communications, parties occassionally reconsider their respective positions and proceed to more amicable
bargaining.
A settlement may result from these initial procedures. If not, one of two
actions will be taken by the commission or its agent. One is the issuance of a
dismissal report. 14 ' In this circumstance, the parties will have available a
formal analysis of the reasons why the charge was dismissed, which may
clarify their bargaining relationship. The second alternative is formal action
42
against the charged party by the commission filing a complaint.1 The commission has largely discontinued its previous practice of issuing a probable
cause letter to the parties before filing its complaint.
Although the commission has not yet squarely faced the issue, an important question -which the commission is destined to face in the context of an
unfair labor practice charge is whether and to what extent the duty to

136. See text accompanying notes 94-120 supra.
137. These events occurred in the context of strikes by Broward and Duval County
teachers. It is interesting to note that PERC is explicitly mandated to balance "provocation!"
only in the case of an administrative assessment of fines, and Florida circuit courts face
an identical mandate only with respect to a civil damage action. See notes 118-119 supra and
accompanying text. However, the Commission actions seem to have been equitable albeit
not required. The injunctions did facilitate a rapid return to bargaining.
138. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
139. FLA. STAT. §447.503 (1977).
140. FLA. STAT. §447.503(1) (1977).
LA. STAT. §447.503(2) (1977). A dismissal by the Commission's General Counsel
141.
may be appealed to the full Commission. Id. at (3).
; 142. FLA. STAT. §447.503(3)(a) (1977). The 1977 amendments to this subsection make
a helpful distinction between the "charges" of the complaining party and the "complaint"
issued by the Commission after investigation.
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bargain will be expanded beyond traditional private sector concepts in order
to fulfill public sector needs.
Preliminary indications are that the commission has, at least in part,
accepted the argument that an expansion of private sector concepts is appropriate under the PERA, and that the relatively unyielding posture characteristic of private sector impasse 143 is not tolerable in Florida public sector
labor relations.144

An extension of the duty to bargain beyond private sector concepts may
be analyzed in terms of its possible effect on the overall scheme of the Act
with respect to implementation of article I, section 6. The present impasse
procedures may be viewed as weakening the constitutional right to bargain
in favor of the constitutional prohibition of a right to strike. An extension
of the duty to bargain may be viewed as having the opposite effect. Such an
adjustment in public sector bargaining requirements has been labeled "compensation" for lack of the strike weapon. 145
Whether or not the commission and the Florida judiciary ultimately
accept an extension of the duty to bargain beyond private sector concepts,
the administrative remedy which may be imposed after successful prosecution
of a refusal to bargain or a bad faith bargaining charge is highly significant.
With respect to pre-impasse bad faith bargaining by a public employer, the
commission has issued cease and desist orders and affirmatively commanded
the parties to return to the table. 146 That remedy has been enforced on appeal
despite the fact that the legislative body involved had subsequently resolved
the disputed issues.1 47 Nullification of impasse procedures by a commission
command to return to the bargaining table may be seen as strengthening
the constitutional right to bargain at the cost of the political control retained
by the legislative body under the Act. Where bad faith bargaining or refusal
to bargain is proven, however, the cost is not assessed against the constitutional strike prohibition. In fact, it might be expected that nullification of
actions taken by a party in bad faith would have the opposite effect - lessening
the risk of a work stoppage.
143. See generally Edwards, supra note 25, at 924-25. It bears notice that the relatively
"unyielding status of private section impasse" is not itself a permanent status. The NLRA
does not require a party to participate in "fruitless marathon discussion at the expense
of frank statements and support of his position." When impasse is reached, the duty to
bargain is not terminated but only suspended.
144. In City of Winter Park, 4 FPER ff4278 (Aug. 9, 1978), the Commission held,
inter alia, that a legislative impasse resolution: (1) may not cover all of the subject which
would properly be the subject of a collective bargaining agreement; (2) is only effective for
one year; and (3) does not terminate the public employer's duty to bargain, on demand,
for the next fiscal year.
145. Edwards, supra note 25, at 933.
146. See, e.g., Hernando County School Board, 3 FPER 246 (Sept. 15, 1977).
147. In Duval County School Bd. v. PERC, 353 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978), the
First District Court of Appeal rejected the public employer's argument that PERC lacked
jurisdiction to order negotiations after termination of the impasse procedures. The court
approved the following statement of the Commission, "An employer will not be permitted
to engage in a course of conduct tantamount to a refusal to bargain and subsequently be
allowed to 'cleanse' its illegal activity through the statutory impasse procedures." Id. at 1249.
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CONCLUSION

The developing legal concepts relevant to frustration in collective bargaining among Florida public employees and employers are of extremely
high social importance. -The Florida PERA has developed as part of a
nationwide expansion of public sector bargaining, the major objective of
which is prevention of disruptions in the flow of government furnished goods
and services. The Florida Constitution grants public employees the right
to bargain but prohibits their right to strike. The tension between these
constitutional principles is dearly reflected in the Act.
The PERA is based on a collective negotiations structure imposing an
obligation on all parties to bargain collectively in good faith. That structure
may be distinguished from a simple meet and. confer requirement which
explicitly retains the public employer's unilateral decision-making power
with respect to conditions of employment after consultation with employees.
The impasse procedures present in the Florida Act are generally helpful
but tend in the case of extreme frustration to make the dispute resolution
process highly political, while substantially equating the public employer
with the political decision-maker. As a result, the Act clearly provides less
motivation for a Florida public employer to bargain in good faith than a
private sector employer. Florida public employees may also be positively
motivated by the Act to engage in an illegal strike in order to attract public
attention to the political dispute.
After impasse procedures have been exhausted, the relationship of those
procedures to the ratification procedures under the Act is not well delineated.
Important questions also arise concerning the duty of the legislative body
to appropriate funds called for by previous legislative impasse resolutions.
Severe penalties for public employee strike are provided in the PERA,
reflecting the constitutional prohibition. However, the Act calls for analysis
of employer provocation before fines are assessed against public employee
organizations. Provocation has similarly been considered in decisions to seek
and grant equitable injunctions against both parties when employer provocation allegedly motivated a strike.
Thoughtful administration of the PERA is important in effectuating the
public policies which underlie it. The PERC is charged with balancing both
the interests of parties and competing social policies under the Act. That
role is apparent in the commission's largely undeveloped mediation function,,
its anti-strike function and its unfair labor practice jurisdiction. The commission has the potential to substantially alleviate bargaining frustration
through careful and thoughtful administration.
The Florida judiciary and legislature face the challenge of further developing the relevant legal concepts by interpretation and amendment. The task
is made difficult by the complexity of the issues and the strength of the competing social policies. The importance of the task to all of Florida's citizens,
including several hundred thousand public employees, cannot be overemphasized.
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